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Abstract 
The main objective of this essay is to examine, analyse and give an in-depth study of the policy of neutrality as a 
principle of foreign policy using the Swedish posture as a case study. Essentially, basic clarifications will be 
made on this principle itself, while attention will be paid to the historical evolution of this policy from the 1820s 
up till the end of the Second World War in 1945 and thereafter.Basically, Swedish neutrality serves as an 
important element in the maintenance of European peace and security, for by opting out of alliances generally 
pre-suggests the outright rejection of war. Reasonably from the foregoing, there is no cause for doubting that 
Sweden will not live up to its demand and expectation for neutrality in event of a conflict near her. But how 
realistic this proposition is especially in the contemporary international system is still questionable and rather 
arduous to achieve. Therefore, in spite of the strict adherence of Sweden to this line of policy for such a long 
period, this work still pre-supposes that neutrality as a foreign policy goal is not realistic.The prospects however, 
for this policy demands a new kind of realism and probably even greater insight and understanding into the 
limitations of this policy. This is because many factors underplay the workability of this principle such as great 
power policies, the balance of power between belligerents and their will to accept not to intervene in the 
activities of the neutrals and such other external provocations, which may necessarily bring about conflicts. 
Taking as a whole, the policy of neutrality continues to remain a subject of concern not only to the realization of 
Swedish foreign policy goals but to the entire human race as long as conflict situations continue to characterize 
the very nature of the international system. 
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Research Objective 
The objective of this essay is to examine, analyze and give an in-depth study of the policy of neutrality as a 
principle of foreign policy using the Swedish posture as a case study. Essentially, basic clarification has been 
made on this principle itself, while attention was paid to the historical evolution of this policy. Attempt was 
equally made to answer such questions as to how credible Swedish neutrality is, what motivations were behind 
the adoption of such a policy line in her foreign policy stance and finally attempt was made to assess Swedish 
neutrality in its external relations and international co-operation, particularly in Africa. 
 
Theoretical Framework of Analysis 
The theoretical framework adopted for this study is the Normative Theory. Most literature in strategic studies 
tend more to give concern to Normative Theory. This is largely because of the post-Second World War 
experiences in which a number of political realists were pessimistic of controlling the war-like tendencies of 
nations. However, this does not demean the significance of the Normative theory in strategic studies. The major 
concern of Normative theory is how to attain a relaxed or stable world order based on the ethical values or 
dilemmas of the individual strategists and the community it serves.
1
 
Normative theory is an issue of value judgment. While admitting the reality of conflict or war in our 
world community, normative theorists make a case for the control and regulation of conflicts or wars so as to 
save mankind of unnecessary waste in technological, economic, ecological and human resources. Since it is a 
moral derivation, normative theory has tried to focus on war crimes, human rights, preventive diplomacy, peace-
making, peace enforcement and peace building. This theory may be associated with the liberal theory which 
believes that countries are capable of finding mutual interests and cooperating to achieve them, by forming ties 
between countries and also by working together for the common good thorough international organizations and 
international law.
2
 
Essentially, with the relaxation of the Cold War particularly since the 1990s, the Normative theory has 
become more pronounced, imposing a new world order of non-confrontation and peace initiatives and non-
military hegemonies. Some scholars have even argued that even laws of conflict management and resolution, 
disarmament, arms control and difference have the value elements of Normative Theory. 
Related to the above theory and equally useful to this work are two other distinct but interrelated 
analytical frameworks - national interest and ideology. Since Neutrality is understudied here as an aspect of 
Swedish foreign policy, it is generally believed that the formulation and execution of foreign policy is 
determined, to a large extent, by the national interest of a nation. Kaplan (1967) for instance, defines it as the 
interest which a national actor has in implementing the needs of the national system of action.
3
 As Joseph 
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Frankel has pointed out “National interest is the sum-total of a nation’s interests and values.”
4
 These involve 
self-preservation, sovereignty and independence standing in the world, glory and prestige, world peace and 
stability, socio-economic wellbeing and a host of others. While Morgenthau conceives of it as simply power 
among power,
5
 Jones (1970) asserts that national interest is a term used in political debate within a country to 
signal the case that the item of policy suggested will bring benefits not merely to proponents but also to its 
opponents.
6
 To achieve all these parameters, Swedish has over the years managed to adhere to her neutrality 
ideology in relation with other nations. 
Ideology is hereby perceived as a self-contained and self-justifying belief system that incorporates an 
overall world view, and provides a basis for explaining what the unit states perceive to be realities. Beginning 
with certain postulates about the nature of man and his place in the world, “it develops from this a moral code, a 
sense of mission, a sense of vision and a programme of action.”
7
 It is imperative to point out here that the issue 
of ideology complements that of national interests in the Swedish neutrality stance and posture in her relation to 
other places. Professor F.S. Northedge refers to ideology as the prevailing orthodoxy of a state.
8
 Michael 
Oakeshort, however, merged politics with ideology and so defines political ideology as a system of ideas 
abstracted from the manner in which people have been accustomed to go about the business of attending to the 
arrangements of their society.
9
 
Normative theory, on the whole, irrespective of the various definitions in addition to the concepts of 
ideology and national interest as espoused, has been used to portray Sweden’s neutrality as motivated and 
nourished over the years.  
 
Research Methodology 
This work is a historical analysis of the policy of neutrality and the evaluation of its evolution and growth over 
the years, drawing out interpretation to the study. The research has therefore employed the use of content 
analysis primarily based on data collection techniques involving research bulletins, journals and newspapers. It 
also utilized a critical review of extant studies both theoretically and empirically and supporting all available and 
reliably coded assumptions on Swedish policy of neutrality by other scholars. All these have been complimented 
with interviews from experts on the subject matter. 
 
Statement of Hypothesis 
In view of the nature of the problem being enquired into in this study as mentioned above, we shall hypothesize 
that given the character of the contemporary international system, neutrality as a foreign policy goal is non-
existent. 
 
Literature Review 
Quite a number of valuable research work has been done on Swedish neutrality, albeit, from scholars of Swedish 
origin. The first real scholarly work done by a Nigerian is that of Adele L. Jinadu,
10
 which tries to see the 
Swedish foreign development policies towards Africa as a whole as based on idealism and pragmatism. This 
work clearly points out quite clearly that Swedish foreign policy towards Africa is guided by its neutrality policy 
even though it is pragmatic. However, the focus on “Neutrality, as a principle of foreign policy” has not been 
seen as a whole except when considered in relation to a particular event. Of particular importance, Adele pointed 
out that the infusion of ideological consideration into the Swedish development policy debate came close to 
assuming cold war dimension. He noted:  
“The conservatives and liberals on the one hand opposed what they viewed as 
an attempt by social democrats to redirect aid to communist or Marxist 
inspired regimes since these tended to be more radically committed to income 
equalization and social development. On the other hand, the social democrats 
and other left wing parties did not want aid channelled to reactionary, Petit 
bourgeois regimes which had shown little or no interest in economic and 
social development.”
11
  
These debates reflected and indicated the politicized dimension which development policy had 
progressively assumed in Sweden’s political economy. Another imbalance according to Adele, is the 
apportioning of embassies in Africa. According to him, “of the nineteen Swedish Embassies in Africa four 
(Abidjan, Bissau, Lagos and Monrovia) are in West Africa, five (Algiers, Cairo, Rabat, Tripoli and Tunis) are in 
North Africa and nine (Addis Ababa, Dar-es-Salam, Gaborone, Kwashasha, Luanda, Lusaka, Maputo, Nairobi, 
Pretoria and Salisbury) are in East and South Africa. There seem to be need for increased diplomatic 
representation in West and Central Africa”.
12
 
Nils Andren in his assessment of Swedish Neutrality has noted, “with the end of the Napoleonic wars in 
1815, Sweden entered into a period of peace that has lasted up to the present day” but that it was not until World 
War 1 that neutrality emerged as a full blown doctrine of foreign policy. He is of the opinion that the 
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transformation of Swedish foreign policy derives from a number of causes, some of which merits particular 
attention; (i) that an altered international balance of power had undermined the basic for any ‘match politik’ on 
Sweden’s part, (ii) secondly, that the course taken by events abroad had served to build up a position of relative 
security. Thirdly, that Sweden did not represent a point of friction between rival great power interests
13
. He 
further asserts that on the home front, developments moved more or less smoothly in the direction of greater 
prosperity and that Sweden was not tempted to enlarge resources to economic growth by embarking on foreign 
expansionist ventures, but rather on a stronger defensive policy. 
Marquis W. Childs’ book, “Sweden: The Middle Way on Trial”
14
 points out that Sweden has always 
sought for a middle way “neutrality in war and aid to those who need it in peace time.” He contends that even 
though preachments on Swedish foreign policy have sounded self-righteous, yet abroad as well as at home, it has 
been determined to live up to the standards set in arriving at a middle way. He claims Swedish aid to Africa as 
well as to other developing countries has been extra-ordinary citing the instances. His conclusion, therefore, is 
that the idealism of neutrality and of co-operation is manifest to take a hold of Third World countries for the 
need to close the gap between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. 
W.M. Carlgen in the book, Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second World War
15
 also reviews the 
course of Swedish neutralist policy throughout the Second World War. He highlights that geography played a 
dominant role in the formulation of Swedish foreign policy. He poses the question: Was Sweden really less 
attractive to the great powers than other Northern European countries during the Second World War? He 
asserted that throughout most of the war years, Germany controlled not only Norway and Finland, but also the 
entire Baltic East Coast, which meant that Sweden was not of sufficient interest to occasion military intervention 
which would give a better return in other quarters provided of course that she suitably met the demands and 
desires which the great powers considered appropriate. He concludes that the policies of the great powers toward 
Sweden during the war years had widely different points of departure but that yet it was possible to discern a 
similar pattern that bordered on the occupation or her participation in the war as essential to victory. 
Professor Erik Lonroth in his article, Sweden’s Ambiguous Neutrality 1939-49
16
 contends that the 
concert between the great powers of Europe, in spite of basic differences in opinion and on some occasions, open 
conflict functioned as a factor of peace in Sweden in numerous precarious situations. He is of the opinion that 
the advantages of a policy of neutrality to Nordic countries were obvious; it would not benefit them to participate 
in a war fought by the major powers, but that they did have prospects of great profit when these powers attacked 
each other. The more respect that could be instilled to the combatants, the greater the profit would be. Stewark 
Oakley in his book, “The Story of Sweden”
17
 gives a historical account and therefore posits that “so much of 
what makes Sweden what it is today lies deeply rooted in her past in which there has been no sharp break.” 
Something of the isolation which dogged her when she was accounted among the proper countries of Europe has 
remained with her. 
Other scholarly work of relevance are those drawn from more recent researches and published for the 
Swedish Institute series,
18 
which are truly worthy of mention for their contribution to the study of neutrality as a 
policy. Krister Wahlback in a classic contribution, “The Roots of Swedish Neutrality”
19
 an important precise 
historical account traces the roots of neutrality from the earliest periods of Karl Johan in the eighteenth century, 
down to the formation of the United Nations and the cold war. He asserts that the lessons learnt in the Second 
World War were particularly fresh when Sweden decided in the late 1940s to continue with a policy of neutrality, 
even though, he is cautious to point out that events of earlier periods also played a role in Swedish thinking. The 
above work is complemented by another short work called “Sweden’s policy of Neutrality,”
20
 based on a lecture 
given by Sverker Astrom in 1976 in Stockholm. His emphases are on the basic principles of the policy and the 
limits of the concept are highlighted. This work concludes with a recommendation of how neutrality could be 
seen in its external context and in a changing world. Another scholar Gunnar Jervas
21
 examines such questions 
as what is the actual nature of the military threat against neutral Sweden? “Has Sweden’s neutrality policy been 
overplayed to the extent it must now be replaced by something else? In his conclusion, he considers which 
problems should be tackled to ensure Sweden’s security and autonomy in the future which amongst others is that 
of maintaining a balance in its relations with all nations. 
In the final analysis, Carl Hallendorf and Adolf Schuck have opined that “still clearer must it appear to 
us that all states with truly neutral inclinations and ideals must make the greatest efforts to promote a true spirit 
of reconciliation between peoples as to ensure their neutrality.”
22
 This is a truism which is demonstrated by 
neutral Sweden. 
Thus, in spite of the reasonably abundant literature on the subject of Swedish neutrality, the bulk of the 
analysis have focused on its historical evolution and/or considered in relation to a particular event such as the 
wars of the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries or the World War 1 and 2. Contrarily, this present work attempts to rectify the 
situation to some extent by specifically departing from others by examining generally from a historical point of 
view and interpreting the growing trend of Swedish neutrality, raising further questions on its credibility, as well 
as providing some understanding to the underlying motive factors of national interest and ideology. Over and 
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above all, Swedish neutrality is seen basically as a principle of foreign policy and ascertaining its effectiveness 
or workability as an instrument/tool of foreign policy in the international comity of nations. 
 
Organization of the Study 
The work is divided into four parts each with its subdivision except for the final section which is the summary of 
findings and conclusion and therefore not subdivided. The first section has six divisions and deals with such 
specifics as (i) literature review, (ii) research objective, (iii) theoretical/conceptual framework, (iv) research 
methodology, (v) statement of hypothesis, and (vi) the organization of the study. 
The second section provides a general survey of the policy of neutrality and some basic clarifications on 
the principle. This part also further delves into the historical development of this policy. 
The third part considers the various reasons and motivations for the adoption of such a policy line in 
Sweden. The credibility problem attempts to analyse how acceptable and credible this policy really is in spite of 
criticism from observers at home and from external observers. This section also incorporates the external 
application of Swedish neutrality in its relations and co-operation to other states. Finally, the conclusion of the 
work which assesses the principle in general in light of the evidences drawn from the body of the work. 
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Basic Clarifications on Swedish Neutrality 
The Debate on “Neutrality” 
The history of neutrality reveals the natural influence and close connection between two other cognate concepts 
– the “status of national sovereignty” and the “status of war.” Therefore, to question the status of one is to 
question the other. However, an answer to the above question is to be found in human nature itself and could 
therefore be equated with a similar question on why people go on committing crimes in spite of prohibition by 
law of such acts? Why do nations go to war against each other in spite of the fact that war has been outlawed by 
the combined effect of the Kellogg-Briand pact and the U.N. charter?
23
 These questions will continue to bother 
men’s mind. Once war has been recognized as necessary condition of international life and granted a status of 
legitimacy, the same must go with neutrality. Since the concept of neutrality is inextricably linked up with the 
concept of a shooting war and keeping a state’s sovereignty, the subject of neutrality will continue to remain a 
serious concern for the human society, they will cease to concern us only when wars cease to exist. 
In trying to define neutrality, the Oxford Concise Dictionary describes it as “occupying a middle 
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position between two extremes belonging to a power which remains inactive during hostilities or exempted from 
the sphere of war-like operations.”
24
 Karl Birbaum has this to say, “in general usage, neutrality may convey rank 
indifference as well as calculated detachment or rationally controlled impartiality.”
25
 In ‘Macbeth’ William 
Shakespeare, used the expression ‘Neutral’ to describe an attitude or state of mind in which one does not portend 
to support any party to an action, while Ancient Swiss language speaks of ‘Neutrals’ as those who ‘sits still’ and 
watch while others fight.
26
 The term neutrality, however, has its origin in the Latin word ‘Neuter’ which literally 
translates ‘neither’. As applied to the field of politics or international relations, one of the original meanings of 
the word ‘Neutral’ is of course, of rulers and states, not assisting either party in the case of a war between other 
states.
27
 All in all, the above definitions seem to qualify or confirm the fact that neutral nations are “Islands of 
Peace” in a world potentially or actually in conflict. 
Strictly speaking, the usage of the term neutrality to describe a country’s foreign policy principle is 
rather ambiguous. This is because in the first place, neutrality should be something which exists only in war time 
conditions. As Gunner Jervas has opined, “It is strictly wrong to claim the neutrality of a country or nation in a 
situation where there is no on-going war in a relative close surroundings.
28
 Secondly, in another sense, William 
L. Pouty has pointed out that the traditional meaning of the term neutrality is legal in nature”
29
 – that neutrality is 
more often referred to as an aspect or doctrine of international law than of a foreign policy stand as the present 
work upholds. From the above assertions two important issues are raised – (i) in light of the initial definitions, 
how justifiable is it then to lay claim to policy of neutrality especially in the absence of war? Is ‘neutrality’ a 
misleading expression therefore to describe Sweden’s present and past positions? Secondly, of what relevance is 
Swedish neutrality to international law since Pouty has pointed out earlier, that the traditional meaning of 
neutrality is legal? Are there any legal implications or obligation for neutralist Sweden especially in her foreign 
policy stand? 
Gunnar Jervas in an effort to clarify the above issue-posers has this to say; “Swedish Neutrality has 
special characteristics”
30
 The thought behind the definition and/or the term neutrality was and is still that 
credible neutrality supposes freedom from any kind of treaty agreements in any direction and as such has no 
legal implication. This should not however constrain our progress and our understanding on this subject as these 
questions have received adequate attention elsewhere by many scholars of Swedish history.
31
  
However, in a not too precise sense, a country which intends to keep out of war potentially in peace 
time or in actuality is called a neutral country. And, as far as legal relevance is concerned, Sweden’s policy in a 
formal sense differs from the legal variation (which shall soon receive the attention of this work) in as much as it 
is based neither on international nor on national constitutional understandings. Sweden’s policy of neutrality is 
purely politically based on nationally adopted measures to enhance its position. It therefore follows that the term 
neutrality aptly used to describe Sweden’s foreign policy is never misleading. However, another way of viewing 
this policy of neutrality, more accurately is as a political philosophy and/or ideology in their foreign stance. Even 
then, that Swedish neutrality is not legally binding to any national or international law does not presuppose that it 
has no relevance to international law.  
Hugo Crotius, author of the first book on the system of international law calls the chapter of his work 
dealing with neutrality “De his qui ibeto medii suit”, - of those who in war are between the belligerents”, and he 
says in his text that neutral nations “are those who are outside the hostilities” (qui extra bellum sunt). In his work, 
he laid down the foundation for the modern doctrine of neutrality and two general laws. The first rule is that a 
neutral state should do nothing which may strengthen a belligerent whose cause is just. The second rule is that in 
a war in which it is doubtful whose cause is just, neutrals should treat both belligerents alike as who has waged 
an unjust war. On the contrary, it is under a duty of absolute impartiality in relation to a belligerent who has 
waged an unjust war, on the contrary, it is under a duty to discriminate in favour of the victim of aggression and 
against unjust belligerent. However, scholars and lawyers of more recent decades have rejected this distinction 
and upheld the unfettered right of neutral to determine the merits of the respective causes of the belligerents and 
steadfastly cling to the duty of absolute impartiality on the part of the neutrals.
32
 
Therefore, the above brief reference to international law background of this concept, is tantamount to 
the fact that neutrality as represented in law has some relevance with Swedish brand even though this latter 
brand has no enforcement clause. However, it should be made clear and emphasized that Swedish neutrality is 
originally based on a strict legal interpretation of the concept of neutrality as defined mainly in the Hagues 
Convention of 1807, “The legal position of this other neutral states Ghil, T. has observed, “however does not 
seem to constitute a major difference in practice to Swedish neutrality.”
33
 To uphold this principle and live up to 
the expectation of these other neutral states and the international scene generally, Sweden has always insisted on 
creating credibility by her own policies, i.e. avoiding all legal commitments to or guarantees from other powers 
avoiding situations in which other countries by reference to such legal provisions could claim a right to influence 
Sweden’s behaviour one way or the other. Most importantly is the fact that Sweden is not aligned to any of the 
power blocs that emerged after the Second World War in 1945 – the NATO and/or Warsaw pact. 
In order to fully understand Swedish neutrality, it is pertinent to make a clear distinction between the 
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concepts of non-alignment and neutrality. Truly, these words are confusive in their usage atimes, but nonetheless 
not contradictory. Hamilton, F. Strong has stressed that neutrality and non-alignment each mean different things 
in different places and at different times. They can even mean different things in the same place and at 
approximately the same time.
34
 Vincent Bakpetu Thomas has however noted that these two concepts have 
similar meanings and the one has often been confused with the other.
35
 He endeavours to make a major 
distinction between neutrality and non-alignment as concepts. “Neutrality” he maintains, involves contracting 
out of world conflicts either for internal safety or not to incur the displeasure of a big nation or for other reasons 
such as smallness in size. While non-alignment means participation in world affairs with a view to influencing 
the two standing blocs in the cold war to modify their outlook.
36
 
Thus, to further clarify the difference between the two principles, while non-alignment is generally 
applied to the outward foreign policy of many colonial (now developing countries), neutrality is found among 
the developed European nations such as Austria, Ireland and Sweden. Secondly, whereas ‘neutrality’ tends to be 
more static and passive, making implicit or explicit promise to be non-belligerent in time of war, the non-
alignment movement does not make such guarantees and more so tends to be more active and revisionist but 
variable in taking their stands. K.P. Misra, has briefly and succintingly pointed out that the ideological bases of 
non-alignment may be understood in terms of five ‘Ds’ which are inextricably interwoven being, Decolonization, 
Disarmament, Development, Détente, and Dissemination.
37
 
Many scholars, it must be pointed out have written on the non-alignment movement as well as 
dimensions of non-alignment, however, one cannot go into all these as this work is mainly concerned with the 
European brand of non-alignment.
38
 It is pertinent to note however, as a saying goes that, “words have no 
meanings except by usage,” both concepts of non-alignment and neutrality share the same views albeit from 
different realms, purposes and background. The above assertion is supported and confirmed by the fact that 
neutral nations of Europe support and share the aspirations of non-alignment, while this their recognition is 
reciprocated by the non-aligned movement by giving them observer status in all their meetings. The confusion 
that the two concepts may bring is however a regrettable confusion but typical for the handling of concepts 
regarded as charged with positive political values. The glaring difference is that while non-alignment is 
associated with countries of the Third World or South-South Cooperation, Neutrality as a principle has been a 
clear patronage of the more advanced countries of Europe whose posture was adopted as a result of their refusal 
to participate in any conflict nor support either of the belligerents. 
Having distinguished between non-alignment and neutrality, it will further the interest of this essay to 
clarify the types, forms or the variations in which the neutrality principle may come. Basically, there are three 
brands of neutrality. The first is the neutrality in a specific instance which is also often termed ‘Ad hoc’ 
neutrality. A good example of this type will be the neutrality followed by the United States in the early stages of 
the First World War. United States however intervened in the war in April 2, 1917 on the pretext that Germany 
had violated U.S. neutrality by sinking her passenger ships which the German’s correctly claimed carried war 
materials aboard these passenger ships for the British. As President Nixon pointed in a speech of 1969, “This 
position was more of insidious form of self-deception overlaid with sanctimony scornful of the cynical politics 
of Europe, where we did not hesitate to impose our will on weaker nations.
39
 This brand of neutrality is 
‘situational and specific’ only in a particular war and therefore is not permanently adhered to. 
Another variation of this concept is the ‘permanent or perpetual neutrality’ which also is sometimes 
referred to as the ‘institutionalized’ neutrality. This variant is exemplified by Switzerland and is frequently 
recognized in some legal form. In Europe, two countries are neutralized by international agreement of Vienna 
Congress in 1815 and the latter by international law and recognition by the United States, Britain, France and 
Soviet Union after its adoption by the parliament in 1955.
40
 
In Asia as well, there have been at least two internationally recognized and neutralized states. These are 
Laos and Cambodia which are forbidden by the Geneva Armistice Agreement of 1954 from entering military 
alliances or allowing foreign military bases on their territory while Finland has been neutral by law since the end 
of the World War II. She (Finland) could not however, effectively assert this posture until the return of the naval 
base at Forkala near Helsinki to her. Ireland’s neutrality could be traced back to the return by Britain in 1938 to 
her the three parts retained under the 1921 treaty.
41 
The last type or variation (our subject matter of discourse) of neutrality is spectacular and unique for the 
circumstances bringing about its permanency. In a sense, Swedish neutrality has been maintained over the years 
that such a trend requires an in-depth consideration. As Kristar Wahlback opines, “it is not easy to give a clear 
answer when Sweden truly began to follow a neutral foreign policy.”
42
 “A Swede is not able to point to a 
similarly obvious date of birth for his country’s policy of neutrality.”
43
 However, Alan Kaastrup has pointed out 
that “many of the principles essentially to present day Swedish neutrality policy were in fact formulated as early 
as 1830s by King Karl XIV. Johan, who earlier as Marshall Bennadotte of France (Napoleon’s deputy in chief) 
had been elected heir to the Swedish throne, in 1810. Karl Johan created the practical conditions for Swedish 
neutrality policy.
44
 This, as the next sub-heading considers, have ever since matured to become a permanent 
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principle of foreign policy. 
 
Historical Development and Justification of Swedish Neutrality 
The year 1815 marked a turning point in Sweden’s history with the end of the Napoleonic wars, apart from 
transient exceptions, she withdrew from her 17
th
 century role as a great and dominant power in the Baltic region 
as well as great power politics. Whereas in earlier epochs, the security of the realm had to a large extent been 
sought in alliances with and subsides from great powers it now became based on a policy of freedom from 
alliances, on efforts to avoid being drawn into continental conflicts again. 
During the earlier part of this period however, foreign policy was not marked by a conscious quest for 
“neutrality.” Nils Andren points out that “Sweden attempted to safeguard her national security by orientating 
herself in turn to different great powers; first Russia, later Britain, and towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
it was Germany.
45
 
It is pertinent to note at this point, that Karl Johan became the first Swedish statesman to describe 
neutrality as an enduring ambition for Sweden. He therefore laid the foundation for the present day neutrality 
policy of Sweden. Ingvar Anderson and Jorgen has also stressed his importance to the study of Swedish 
neutrality, for from his archives comes a couple of documents written by him on the pre-history of this policy.
46
 
The first of this document is a confidential memorandum dated 4 January, 1834, presented on Karl Johan’s 
instruction to the British and Russian governments. This action was prompted by a crisis in the Middle East 
which was generally believed might lead to war between British and Russia. Eventually war did not break out 
however Karl Johan thought it wise to give, well before any conflict might begin, what he called a formal 
explanation of strict and independent neutrality. 
The basis for this Swedish neutrality was provided by the country’s geographical position and the real 
national interests suggested by its internal conditions. She had renounced all the thought of regaining her 
provinces lost during the Napoleonic wars, and now centered her efforts on instilling confidence in Sweden’s fair 
and disinterested attitude among the two powers which were most important to her. In Karl Johan’s words: 
We cannot have any other desire than to be ourselves when we determine 
our policy to be ourselves when we assert our independence and to speak 
out minds clearly, precisely because we do not have any private mental 
reservations.
47
 
He confirmed with the secret committee of his parliament that his memorandum was well received in 
London and Petersburg, (Britain and Russia being the major powers around her then). He emphasized that 
Sweden had important interests to defend in her relations with both these great powers: 
In the case of Russia, we must take into account her close proximity to us, 
her greatly superior strength and certain trading interests. We are linked to 
Britain through our whole industrial and commercial system and by naval 
considerations.
48
 
Thus, from the above, one can infer that the cautious and conscious considerations for the national 
interest played a major role in Swedish thinking for her neutrality. Karl Johan therefore rallied for support from 
his people as a simple declaration of neutrality was not enough, unless there was a firm will to uphold and 
defend it adequately. The need for a strong defence policy and finds to support neutrality was as well important. 
Though, war did not break out in 1834, it created the arena for the expression of Swedish position between the 
East and West. In terms which recall George Washington’s farewell address, Karl Johan declared: 
Separated as we are from the rest of Europe, our policy and our interests 
will always lead us to refrain from involving ourselves in any dispute which 
does not concern the two Scandinavians peoples.
49
 
Thus, Karl Johan’s contribution to the development of Swedish neutrality was unparalleled even though 
he was not sufficiently remembered. This is probably so because ‘neutrality’ as a principle of foreign policy had 
not then matured, as he did not speak of neutrality as principle of foreign policy even, except of those occasions 
as 1834 when he thought the outbreak of war was imminent. Instead, he described his foreign policy in peace 
time as one of “balance between the great powers and non-involvement in continental dispute.”
50
 
Secondly, Johan found it difficult to accept an excessively passive and modest role on the European 
scene. As such, he enunciated conflicting proposals to his set out principles. He also felt restless impulse as 
former leading actor in European politics to intervene in international crises as a mediator or adviser, and strict 
restraint in this respect has long been regarded as a necessary constituent in a policy of neutrality. For these and 
other reasons, some have not always regarded Karl Johan as the author of Swedish neutrality. It must be 
emphasized however that the history of Swedish neutrality cannot be written without a worthy tribute to Karl 
Johan for his contributions until 1844 when he died never changed in his policy line. The foundation laid by Karl 
Johan was not yet sufficient for permanent neutrality. For soon, this neutrality policy was put to test as “three 
short wars”
51
 on the shores of the Baltic which saw Prussia become the most powerful state on the continent. 
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Rivalry between Russia and France led to the Crimean war of (1854-1856), which involved Anglo-French naval 
operations in the Baltic, and in which would have spurred Sweden into the war. Left to the initiatives of the 
Kings that reigned after Karl Johan, Oscar 1 1844-1859 and Karl XV 1859-1872, would have de-neutralized 
Sweden. There were so numerous divergences in the principle of neutrality during these periods that it would 
have been natural to later observers to choose some other point as the starting point for Sweden’s neutrality. 
However, in 1864, Sweden was restrained only by her own weakness from helping Denmark against Prussia and 
Austria. This image was not too good for the growth and striving of neutrality in Sweden. 
However, this image changed in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71, as Sweden’s neutrality was self-
evident. The war however dealt a hard blow to Sweden’s Karl XV, who had thought contrarily that France will 
emerge victorious, but much to his own dismay and for France as well, the German empire emerged the victor. 
This was not all, the liberal opinion in Sweden was as well hurt for these Swedes were reluctant to abandon all 
ambitions that Sweden might yet again play a prominent role in international affairs. 
Twenty years of adventure, (i.e. 1844-1871), a return to the traditional cautious foreign policy of Karl 
Joan XIV was resorted back to in view of certain changes in the balance of political forces at home. Oscar II 
(1872-1907) resolved to improve Sweden’s relations with St. Petersburg and especially with Berlin, and was 
ultimately successful in achieving both these objectives. However, it should be pointed out again that at the tail 
end of the century again both the external and the internal pre-conditions for the successful pursuit of a policy of 
neutrality deteriorated. Karl Johan had been able to rely on a remote and cautious Britain to provide a 
counterweight to Russia. This however, became more difficult now that equilibrium between the great powers in 
Northern Europe had to be maintained with the impatiently ambitious Wilhelmine German as a third and 
increasingly important player in the game. The presence of both a German and a Russian giant on the shores of 
the Baltic involved a risk of conflicts into which Sweden could be easily drawn into. Another important 
development, was that the coming of railways and modern warships reduced the importance of the Scandinavian 
Peninsula’s remote and semi-insular geographical position which Karl Johan had so frequently relied on. 
At the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, Sweden’s policy of neutrality enjoyed less credibility 
abroad than was desirable. This was much so because Sweden had just emerged from a protracted crisis in her 
domestic politics. In February 1914, Gustav V (1907-1950) had publicly demanded that the government should 
rapidly decide to extend the period of military service. As a result, the liberal ministry had resigned and a 
government of conservative civil servants had been appointed. The new government had dissolved the second 
chamber and the ensuing election campaign presented the outside world with the spectacle of political parties in 
profound disagreement with each other over not only constitutional questions but also defence and foreign policy. 
During the first days of the war, an official statement and declaration of neutrality was issued, but the foreign 
minister seemed to have made a number of equivocal statements as to whether the Germans would accept 
Sweden’s neutrality or compel them to go to war on their side or bear the consequences. A defeat of Russia, 
some of the ministers considered was vital to Swedish interests as such their neutrality could be titled to favour 
Germany. 
After considerable success for Germany, first in the West and then in the East, Berlin threw out 
repeated feelers to Stockholm for alliance without which brought attractive gains for Sweden at Russia’s expense 
– the Aaland Islands, a dominant position in Finland and in the small countries south of the Gulf of Finland. This 
offer had strong advocates in Swedish royal courts – Queen Victoria (daughter of Grand Duke Frederick of 
Baden and Louise daughter of Kaiser Wilhelm 1, but with Hjalmar Hammarskjold as Prime Minister and 
Wallenberg, a prominent banker as Foreign Minister. Sweden stood firm by the neutrality declared at the 
beginning of the war. Thus, after the four years, neutrality had gained a special glamour in Swedish eyes – a 
guarantee of escaping the havoc of a major war. But intermittently at any rate, it had also been seen as something 
transcending Sweden’s own interest for it had prepared the ground for Sweden’s contribution to the service of a 
higher and more universal good. Even though, the country’s survival at times came before principles, yet 
Hammerskold declaration on the neutral’s mission to safeguard for future generation essential rules of 
international law, won approval in many quarters. 
It must be noted that during the 1920 and 1930s, various Swedish governments professed adherence to 
neutrality aim more or less consistently and in the general haze of the League of Nations, they departed at least 
on the face of it. In step with ever increasing fear of fresh war between the great powers of Europe, international 
solidarity more and more became a side issue. However, initiatives for a joint Nordic or more accurately 
Swedish-Finish defence policy also remained on paper, once again in the shadows of a threatening storm 
neutrality became the guiding star of Swedish foreign policy. 
During the Second World War (1939-45), the faith of ‘Neutrality’ as guiding the policy in Sweden was 
clearly of advantage to the government in its effort to build a national unity around its foreign policy which 
according to a declaration issued on the first day of hostilities aimed at complete neutrality. Her own 
determination to keep herself out of war or the great power tussle was not sufficient as throughout most of the 
war years, Germany controlled not only Norway and Finland but also the entire Baltic East. The chances of 
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extricating herself from this German grip depended therefore on the victory of  Germany’s opponent. In 1940-41 
and in 1944-45, when the balance of power was upset, Sweden’s room for manoeuvre was extremely limited. 
The veil which the rules of neutrality drew over various moves dictated by political reality was thin and 
sometimes rent. However, in general, the Swedish authorities believed that prospects of preserving her neutrality 
in the event of the world war were fully fairly good, as such the major political parties supported neutrality. 
Thus, by the end of the Second World War, little substance was left to the acclamation of a strong 
neutrality policy. This was an outcome rested on certain guiding principles, neutrality in relation to great power 
conflicts, a strong defence, active participation in international organizations and co-operation in general, even 
though, there have been divergences yet as Hansson has pointed out: 
On each occasion, our overriding aim was to keep Sweden out of the war, if 
this could be done without loss of independence. It is clear that we could not 
ignore the realities of power in this connection. It has not been possible to 
follow a strict policy -what country has incidentally been able to do that – 
and we have had to judge each time what was compatible with our essential 
objective.
52
 
The primary instrument of post war security policy remained – non-participation in alliance in peace 
time aiming at neutrality in the event of war was defined over the following years. The basis having been laid by 
her (Sweden’s) experiences during earlier phases in the history of her neutrality as has been shown so far. The 
lessons drawn from the past sometimes varied from one individual or strand of opinion to another. The collective 
experience of a nation cannot be defined with all certainty, however, the fact that Sweden has been able to 
remain at peace for a hundred and seventy years is a basis for their continued pursuance of the policy. In 
conclusion, the words of Osten Unden, Foreign Minister in 1945, in a reassuring declaration of Sweden’s stand: 
The Swedish people must for their part earnestly desire – both because of 
their own vital interests and for idealistic reasons – that a political division of 
states into mutually hostile groups from neutrality to the degree that its 
charter requires. However, if against expectation a tendency for the great 
powers into two camps manifests itself within the organization, our policy 
must be to avoid being drawn into any bloc or groups.
53
 
Thus, it can be seen that the objectives of the neutrality policy has been for the fulfilment of the national 
interest, goals and ideals of the Swedish people and much more a product of historical circumstances which has 
become a sort of traditional symbol, national myth with ideology consciousness. 
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Motives for Adoption of Neutrality 
The foreign policy of any country has some goals to achieve, and as a tool for the realization of particular 
objectives for which it is adopted. These goals are directed towards the realization or non-realization of national 
objectives or interests, depending upon how and to what extent they are pursued. Therefore, as Hans Morgenthau 
has opined, “no nation can have true guide as to what it must do in foreign policy without accepting national 
interest as that guide.”
54
 Therefore, with this basic ideology and framework, one can proceed to consider 
Swedish motivations for adopting and sticking to this line of policy over the years. As would have emerged from 
the historical evolution of this policy highlighted in the last section, it will be seen that the policy of neutrality 
covered all measures which served to keep Sweden out of war, security and various factors which on the whole 
scored the interest of the nation. Karl Birnbaum has posited that “the possibilities of a country to pursue a 
successful policy of neutrality are not only affected by the balance of power and a strong defence but also on 
whether the country in question enjoys a high degree of economic independence and possesses a differentiated 
industry and commerce
55
 - therefore interplay of factors, some of which are considered below are responsible for 
its adoption of Neutrality. 
Firstly, one important motive for the adoption of Swedish neutrality has to do with Sweden’s 
geographical and strategic position in Europe. Sweden happens to be a medium sized democratic country in 
Northern Europe
56
 with strong economic ties with the Western world, at the crossroads between major strategic 
interests and in the immediate proximity of areas of vital demographic economic and military importance to one 
of the super powers U.S.S.R. Being so situated, it stands to reason that Sweden should have two aims; the one to 
avoid coming under the influence of the nearby super power and the other to avoid becoming the menacing 
outpost of the other super power. A policy of neutrality is therefore the answer in order not to be strangled by 
these two super powers. In the words of Sverker Astrom, “the content of this policy is decided from case to case 
in the light of the main purpose of our security policy – to strengthen the safeguards of our national 
independence and our democratic society, to preserve and if possible, improve the chance of saving Sweden 
from war.”
57
 Therefore, the first important motive for the adoption of Swedish neutrality is for security purposes 
to safeguard her national independence. 
Secondly, this policy is not only for war time use. It is also relevant in peace time and in this respect, 
aims at preserving the Nordic area as a whole quiet corner of the world. Even though, security is a basic motive, 
yet another secondary fact is that this policy has given Sweden a particular profile on the international scene and 
makes it easier for her to pursue an active independent, co-operation, environment, laws of war disarmament as 
well as acting as international peacemaker and mediator. Neutrality inspires a certain confidence in Swedish, 
independent judgment and these ‘spin-off’ affects according to Astrom Sverker are all to the good enhancement 
of the value of our neutrality.
58
 
Economically, Swedish free trade policy is adopted along lines of her neutrality policy. Sweden is 
dependent on outside sources for raw materials, fuels and a great range of finished goods as such the policy 
makes her open to a wide variety range of markets without bias to any of the power blocs. She has systematically 
avoided commitments that may impinge on her policy of neutrality in trade relations as well. Finally, the 
Swedish neutrality policy as this essay has shown so far must be seen in the context of Swedish history. The 
adherence to this policy line has saved her from two major World Wars as well as other minor ones. Obviously, 
neutrality alone cannot account for this safety, but also strategic and political circumstances and advantages, yet 
neutrality prevailed as the requisite for keeping Sweden out of these wars. Instinctively, after the Second World 
War, the Swedish felt neutrality represented as a ‘safety belt’ and a guarantee of peace for them. For the fact that 
this policy has been a source of strength and has never failed since its adoption, more so, in addition the 
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overwhelming support by the Swedish people to the government for adoption of neutrality has made it come to 
stay to the benefit of all – the national interest of the country. 
 
Defence of Credibility of Swedish Neutrality 
In light of the evaluation so far, the credibility of Swedish neutrality principle has become a major bone of 
contention and controversy amongst scholars as well as observers in the international scene. There have been 
divergent criticisms and variants of opinion internally and externally as to how credible Swedish neutrality really 
is to either of the power blocs or to the world as a whole. As Gunner Jervas has pointed out, “There appears to be 
a tendency to attribute to Swedish neutrality policy some kind of intrinsic value, in fact, some would even seem 
to consider it sacrosanct.”
59
 Taking into consideration, the fact that Sweden has remained outside the two major 
wars, the question of consistency seems to hold, but putting out imagination to the test, one is forced to make re-
evaluations, examine the norms, departures and divergences by Sweden from the principle as such deem it as not 
entirely sacrosanct. 
Criticisms focuses mainly on the divergences from the rules of neutrality, some support the departures 
on the ground that the credibility of this policy is not dependent on international guarantee or constitutional 
legislation and/or that Sweden alone decides what requirements its policy of neutrality entails.
60
 Critics on the 
other hand have simply condemned these divergences out-rightly irrespective of their importance or of the 
circumstances in which they occurred.
61
 In their own view, a neutral country was simply obliged to observe the 
rules of neutrality as prescribed by international law, whatever the risks that great power might attack. Some 
Americans after they were drawn into the Second World War claimed that neutrality was “immoral” and that 
Sweden should have chosen a policy other than neutrality.
62
 Other further question the empirical foundation or 
basis for such a policy at all, arguing that in an increasingly interdependent world no nation can really be neutral 
even so in their foreign policy. Even though, events of the First and Second World War may have made it seem 
so, there were still evidence of divergences drawn from the Second World War where Sweden titled her 
neutrality to sooth her purposes and especially Germany.
63
 A fact upheld by this work. 
But as Gunnar has pointed out in his defence of Swedish neutrality, “The critics of our neutrality policy 
were not opposed to neutrality as such, all they wanted at any rate was for Sweden to follow a neutrality policy 
of such as unbending variety; a policy which would have involved exposing Sweden to the full horrors of war, 
even though, no vital Swedish interests were involved.”
64
 Gunnar further points out that small states cannot be 
asked to risk their existence for the sake of some uncertain calculation about their role in the global struggle 
between the big wigs.
65
 Gunnar Jervas on his part maintains that neutrality is not in itself an end but a rational 
means which has been and is still is considered effective towards the attainment of Swedish security objectives 
defined by the government aimed at maintaining the country’s independence.
66
 
At this point, it should be stated that the premise on which Swedish neutrality is therefore based is that 
it is a line of foreign policy independently chosen by the government which in principle is open to modification 
at any given time or moment.
67
 The condition which in theory enables the government to change Swedish 
neutrality policy at any given time does imply that this is always practicable. This line of policy however creates 
a platform from which Sweden enters the international scene an extra-ordinary advantageous position enabling 
independent stands and active participation in areas of great importance. 
Whatever consideration may therefore be argued, either for or against the principle of neutrality as 
practiced by Sweden is less to be desired. To what extent, Swedish neutrality appears credible to other states – 
the decisive factor would depend on a number of circumstances. As earlier mentioned, freedom from alliances 
creates a kind of automatic involvement mechanism. On this point, Sweden fulfils expectations reasonably well 
as was not tied to either of the world blocs, NATO or the Warsaw pact during the cold war period. Secondly, it 
has long been considered that neutrality policy must be backed by a relative strong defence and that it should be 
organized in such a way to guarantee continued supply of at least basic necessities in case of war. It is often 
believed that strict neutrality is a guarantee against aggression, this is not true in all its entirety, for even if a 
nation fulfils all condition imposed by international law on neutral countries, this does not furnish any kind of 
guarantee against attack. Neutrality indeed is an important form of protection, provided there is no race situation, 
if there is such a situation, it therefore means that neutrality is not practicable. 
Gunner Jervas has posited that “claims by one side that Swedish neutrality fails to fulfil reasonable 
demands need not necessarily be genuine or well founded.”
68
 This as he pointed out is because tactical 
motivation may just as well be the underlying factor, i.e., purposeful intentions to provoke reactions to favour 
their sides of interest. Criticisms of Swedish policy does come from both East and West even though it has 
different characteristics. From the Soviet bloc then, the message usually was that Sweden does not show 
sufficient impartiality but tends to lean westwards. It was asserted that Swedish decision makers have more 
contact with their West counterparts. And that weapons are supplied by the U.S. to a considerable degree to 
Sweden. Another criticism is that which claims that military defence of a small state is increasingly impossible 
today and that Sweden should therefore adopt a neutrality policy which downgrades the military versus the 
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political factor. That in essence, Moscow would wish Sweden to limit relations with the West and embark on a 
more active neutrality policy – adopting an attitude similar to that of Finland.  
Even after the cold war, criticism from the U.S. is somewhat different. Washington claims that Swedish 
defence investments are too small relative to Soviet build up and that as such she is obliged to the latter. The U.S. 
can envisage helping her with modern technology as long as this is not re-exported to the Russia. Thus, 
Washington wishes Sweden to strengthen her defence hopefully through U.S. co-operation in order to avoid 
what to them appears a dangerous slide. If one is then to weigh the quantity of criticism against Swedish 
neutrality from different directions, one will notice that more comes from the Moscow. However, one would 
think that the less criticism from any side – the better. This is not so certain, because there is also the risk that a 
well meant attitude more or less free from criticisms by one side can be utilized by the other as proof of the lack 
of impartiality. Even a total lack of criticism may be preferable, but since this is not so possible, then it may 
supposedly be better for a neutral state to receive about the same amount from both sides therefore creating a 
kind of intrinsic balance. However, the idea that Sweden might be forced to opt for one of these alternatives on a 
more permanent basis seems rather rigid. It would be more plausible to imagine development whereby as a result 
of Soviet power extension, Sweden will begin to accommodate Eastward pressures, though there will be sharp 
criticisms at home – Sweden. It seems however more realistic for the policy to be firmly anchored, whilst 
making adjustments in both directions. For example, as regards the U.S., Sweden tends to comply more strictly 
with their petitions not to re-export advanced technology to the Russia as the case may be. Russia as well in 
reaction also advocates for a nuclear free zone as example of a more active neutrality policy. 
On the whole and from a wider perspective, one can probably claim that Swedish appeasement 
measures to both blocs are marginal. But the realization of neutrality as a principle of foreign policy, if not myth 
taking the nature of the international system will require a lot of both human and material input. A cautious 
balance has to be presented such that in spite of criticisms, either from east or west, internal or external belief in 
its credibility will be strengthened. 
 
Sweden’s Neutrality and International Relations 
After the Second World War, one immediate question that arose was that of Sweden’s membership of the United 
Nations since somehow joining this organization seemed obvious, because the organization had collective 
security and peaceful co-operation on its programme. But somehow, the organization charter seemed 
incompatible with a policy of neutrality. The policy of neutrality aimed at prevention from being drawn into war 
between the great powers and since the two powers must be in agreement before the Security Council could 
make a decision on applying military or other sanctions, Sweden therefore ran no risk of being ordered by the 
Security Council to declare war on either of them. Thus on this premise, Sweden could become a member of the 
United Nations Organization. 
On joining the U.N., Sweden’s policy of neutrality continued to have great bearing on her role. On the 
one hand, difficult considerations of non-alignment and international solidarity have led to be weighed against 
one another whenever certain situations of wide import have arisen in the U.N. – the Korean War of 1950-1953 
and/or the Lebanese crisis 1975-76. However as a rule, these problems have been resolved in clear favour of 
non-alignment. On the other hand, the consistent application of this policy has gained acceptance for Sweden as 
an uncommitted state with no axe to grind in bloc infested conflicts. Sweden is therefore considered very useful 
for mediating tasks or roles ever since Folk Bernadotte was sent to Palestine in 1948 for holding offices in World 
body. 
Secondly, Sweden’s other important function in the U.N. has been to urge the super-powers to use their 
superior resources in such a way that the interests of the weaker nations are taken into full account. Sweden’s 
active participation is exemplified by the fact that she has taken more part in peace-keeping operation than any 
other country. Over 40,000 Swedes have served with the U.N. forces around the world.
69
 
The policy of neutrality is also reflected in Sweden’s attitude towards regional co-operation in Europe. 
When the council of Europe was formed in 1949, she did not hesitate to join as it was well suited to states who 
did not want to commit themselves to far reaching European integration or to accept the authority of supra-
national bodies. The council was empowered only to advice and not to make binding decisions on questions of 
military and security policy which lay outside its purview. Sweden did not however, join the NATO, but she is 
one of the leading spokesmen for free trade, EFTA as well as a comprehensive free trade agreement with the 
EEC
70 
considering the fact that a close relationship with the EEC was thought as very important. On grounds of 
trade policy, the stand taken by Sweden may be said to show that the country’s economic interests are 
subordinated to those of its neutrality principles. 
One important part of Swedish foreign policy is the very close co-operation with other Nordic countries 
– Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway. Even though, these countries have decided in favour of other national 
security solutions than that of Sweden. For example, Denmark and Norway plays a prominent role in NATO 
while a special relationship exists between Finland and the Soviet Union. However, far-reaching practical co-
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operation is carried on. The Nordic countries as a whole have a tradition despite any alliance or non-alliance in 
the field of developmental assistance. Continuous Nordic consultations take place in the field of multilateral as 
well as bilateral development co-operation. In the latter field, collaboration is demonstrated by jointly financed 
Nordic developmental projects in Tanzania, Kenya and Mozambique.
71
 
The formation of the United Nations Organization necessarily brought in a large number of new and 
uncommitted states into focus and limelight. The entrance into international politics presented new challenges as 
well as new scopes for manoeuvre between the power blocs. Sweden however, was guided by the resolutions of 
the U.N. on the Middle East issue from the position plan of 1947, the creation of Israel to resolutions 242 (1967) 
and 338 (1973). Sweden sees the fulfilment of the national rights of the Palestinian people including the rights to 
establish a state of their own living at peace with Israel as another basic element of a durable peace.
72
 
Sweden further paid increasing attention to the needs of developing countries for assistance in line with 
their humanitarian traditions and to help with another objective of Swedish foreign policy and thereby foster 
international solidarity and continued peaceful development. Neutrality with the absence of an embarrassing 
colonial past give Sweden a good spring board for gaining the confidence of developing countries. It also 
heightens her responsibilities and opportunities for providing assistance. Unlike some of the aids from the super 
powers which are devised to promote their own general strategic interests, Sweden has avoided making her help 
conditional refraining from attaching strings to it, rather it is directed to serve the cause of improved relations. In 
1977, Sweden magnanimously wrote off more than £300m sterling of state loans to poor countries to reduce 
their debt problem.
73 
Commitment to the liberation of coloured peoples
74
 is another aspect which has given considerable 
concern on Sweden’s position. Sweden has stated that U.N. Security Council must decide on economic sanctions 
against South Africa whose apartheid is seen as a threat to international peace. While awaiting such decisions, 
Sweden seeks to influence other countries to exert pressures on the South African government, and in 1979, the 
Swedish government enacted a law prohibiting new investments in South Africa before the majority rule was 
established.
75
 
Within this framework, Sweden granted considerable humanitarian assistance to South African and 
Namibian refugees and to the liberation movements ANC and SWAPO in that period
76. 
Whatever the nature of 
the aids and line of policy actions, the postures have been nicely adjusted so as to make clear Sweden’s 
determination to avoid siding with or against the great powers before the termination of the cold war then. 
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Summary of Findings and Conclusion 
All along, this work has sought to examine the principle of neutrality as practiced and upheld by the North 
European country of Sweden. The study has been able to establish that the chief objective of her neutrality has 
been to preserve the country’s freedom of action in foreign affairs, so that the policy will not be visited in 
advance in the event of war. As will have emerged from the essay so far, the intermediate position that this 
policy has placed or conferred on Sweden has enhanced her potential for playing an active mediatory role in the 
international stage. As should also be noted this policy is an important element in the effort to maintain peace 
and security throughout the European Continent, because the very orientation of this policy itself is a rejection of 
war as a means of resolving international problems, an emphatic refusal to have anything to do with such a 
policy. 
 Sweden’s freedom to act in principle as reflected during the First and Second World Wars (even though 
titled at times to suit prevailing realities) as well as her post-war postures has just been restricted as if her 
neutrality were guaranteed or imposed by international treaty or even by their constitution. The prospects of this 
principle especially in an age of increased international interdependence however demands a kind of realism and 
probably even greater insight into the outer most limits of her ability to act as an international performer. New 
choices should be weighed carefully to decide on courses of action to take in her role between the blocs in the 
United Nations Organization as well as her negotiation and relations with the developing countries. Altogether, 
these courses should fit in with her non-alignment principles which also underline the conduct of an active 
foreign policy in peace time. 
 Reasonably, from the foregoing, there is no cause for doubting that Sweden will not live up to the 
demands of neutrality in the case of conflict near her surrounding but to what extent could she ward off 
aggressors who do not feel obliged to respect her neutrality is a question yet to be answered. This is because as 
Alf Johansson and Norma has pointed out “the possibilities for a state to maintain the status of neutrality in time 
of war may to a considerable extent be regarded as a function of great power policy.”
77
 The balance of power 
between the belligerents and the will of the two to accept that they will not or cannot attack the natural state.  
 One other important fact that could justify this posture is that of striving to make her neutrality more 
credible, which will depend on her will to continually fulfil such demands and capacity to convince potential 
aggressors that an attack on her cannot be expected to be advantageous. This will go a long way in allowing her 
to maintain the needed balance. Thus, as Gunnar Jervas has observed, the implication of this as a general 
position is that “Neutrality for a country occupying a strategically important position within an area dominated 
by great power interest such as Sweden is only feasible so long as it provides adequate safeguards”.
78
 Safeguards 
in this sense, would practically interpret to the fact that they must actually be prepared for war through 
acquisition of stand-by ammunitions and combat ready military setup at any given time. More so, the realization 
of her objectives and motivations will depend on her ability to distinguish more clearly between real and tactical 
criticism of her policy. 
 Finally, this must however be complemented in the language of Morgenthau, by the fact, “that the 
national interests, goals and ideals of a nation for survival and upholding political morality can be fully realized 
if the nation is conscious not only of its own interests but also those of other nations.”
79
  
The bottom line, therefore, of the Neutrality principle of foreign policy as the statement of hypothesis 
has sought to prove then is that there may be no perfect state of Neutrality for any country of the world 
including that of Sweden which may be subject to attack as Adolf Hitler did on September 1, 1939, an event 
which led to the Second World War.   
As Grant and Temperly have noted:  
The first phase of the war began with the invasion of Poland and ended with the 
fall of France. It began without declaration or formality with the attack by 
German Air Force on the 1
st
 September on Polish military targets, airfields, 
military bases, training centres and railway functions and with the march of the 
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German Army at the dawn of the same day. The declaration of war by Britain 
and France two days later did not save Poland.
80  
Here is a food for thought—what if such as attack had been directed to Sweden?
 
 A country may 
declare itself a “neutral” but when it is subjected to a sudden attack, must fight back! 
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